## Dependency-graph-based protocol analysis

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# **Dependency graphs**

Directed graph, nodes are labeled with operations.

- The label of a node determines its in-degree.
- Incoming edges are (usually) ordered.
- Nodes of a DG compute values, purely functionally.
- Edges describe where the values are used for further computations.
- Special nodes are used to bring inputs to the system.
  - ...and transmit the outputs.

## A protocol

- $\blacksquare$  A wants to send the secret M to B.
- $\blacksquare$  S is a trusted server.

$$A \longrightarrow B: A, B, \{N_A\}_{K_{AS}}$$
$$B \longrightarrow S: A, B, \{N_A\}_{K_{AS}}, \{N_B\}_{K_{BS}}$$
$$S \longrightarrow A: \{K_{AB}, N_A\}_{K_{AS}}$$
$$S \longrightarrow B: \{K_{AB}, N_B\}_{K_{BS}}$$
$$A \longrightarrow B: \{M\}_{K_{AB}}$$



Generate keys  $K_{AS}$  and  $K_{BS}$ 



# A protocol









Mobility, Ubiquity, Security, Dagstuhl, 26.02-02.03.2007 - p. 4/24



#### **Good sides**

- The structure of definitions and uses of values is explicit.
  - No copying of values.
  - No variable names at all...
- We immediately see what is used where.
  - ... which greatly simplifies finding out whether some cryptographic reduction is allowed.
  - ... and also helps doing other simplifications.

## **Some obvious simplifications**



## **Some obvious simplifications**



We can do dead code elimination afterwards.

## **Some obvious simplifications**



# **Simplifying encryption**

- If the symmetric encryption is IND-CCA and INT-CTXT secure then we can replace the encryptions and decryptions as follows:
  - Encryptions replace the plaintext with some constant 0.
  - Decryptions replace them by
    - comparing the ciphertext with the results of all encryptions (with the same key);
    - if there is a match then take the corresponding (original) plaintext as the result;
    - if there is no match then fail.
- Image: provided that the key is used <u>only</u> for encrypting and decrypting.

# Which keys are OK?





## **Semantics**

- ▶ Let  $\{0,1\}^*_{\perp} = \{\bot\} \cup \{0,1\}^*$  where  $\bot$  is the smallest value and everything else is incomparable.
- Let  $\mathbb{B} = \{ false, true \}$  with false  $\leq true$ .
- Let  $V_D$  [resp.  $V_B$ ] be the set of nodes returning bit-strings [booleans].
- The adversary may set the values of input nodes (but only moving upwards).
- The environment sets the randomness sources.
- The values of other nodes are monotonically computed from their inputs.

## **Semantic functions**

- All yellow nodes are strict.
- Green nodes are monotone boolean operations.
- The value of blue nodes is not \(\triangle only if the incoming control dependency edge carries true.
- The MUX works as follows:
  - If the control dependency is false, or all guards are false, then the result is  $\perp$ .
  - Otherwise, if exactly one guard is true, then the result is the corresponding incoming value.
  - Otherwise, the result is  $\top$ .

#### **Semantics**

The valuation of the entire graph has the type

$$((V_D \longrightarrow \{0,1\}^*_{\perp}) \times (V_B \longrightarrow \mathbb{B}))^{\top}$$

- The semantic functions of nodes define a monotone function on graph valuations.
- Its least fixed point is the semantics of the graph.

A good thing — the order of the execution of nodes is not fixed.

#### **Computation** $\leftrightarrow$ **MUX**



# Application...



# Application...





# **Representing infinite graphs**

- Nodes in different planes, but in the same position are represented by a single node.
  - Such nodes are one-dimensional.
- There may be replication inside replication.
  - The corresponding nodes in the representation have more than one dimension.
- In the representation, the edges are equipped with coordinate mappings.
- In the representation, the edges generally cannot go from a higher-dimensional node to lower-dimensional node.
  - Exceptions: target node is an *infinite or* or MUX.
  - Then we record which dimensions are contracted.

## **Arguing about control**

- In our experience, the hardest part of the analyser has been the simplification of control dependencies.
  - Meaning: to derive that some node is always false.
- Some simplifications can be done locally.
  - Constant propagation, copy propagation, flattening, etc.
- More interesting ones require the analysis of the whole graph.

#### $\Rightarrow$

- When does  $v_1 = \text{true imply } v_2 = \text{true}$ ?
  - If  $v_1 = \dots \& v_2 \& \dots$
  - If  $v_2 = \ldots \lor v_1 \lor \ldots$
  - If  $v_1 \Rightarrow v_3$  and  $v_3 \Rightarrow v_2$ .
  - If  $v_2 = w_1 \& \cdots \& w_t$  and  $v_1 \Rightarrow w_i$  for all i.

• If 
$$v_1 = w_1 \lor \cdots \lor w_t$$
 and  $w_i \Rightarrow v_2$  for all  $i$ .

On the representation, we have to record coordinate equalities, too.

• If 
$$v_1[c_1, \ldots, c_k] = \bigvee_{j \in \mathbb{N}} v_2[c_1, \ldots, c_k, j]$$
 then also

$$v_1[c_1,\ldots,c_k] \Rightarrow \operatorname{OneOf}(v_2[c_1,\ldots,c_k,*])$$

## **Using** $\Rightarrow$

- Simplification of control dependencies.
- If the control dependency of some node u computing  $X(\ldots, v, \ldots)$  implies that the node " $v \stackrel{?}{=} w$ " is true then replace u with  $X(\ldots, \operatorname{Merge}(v, w), \ldots)$ .
  - In this way we record the equality of values in the graph.
- If the control dependency of some MUX implies the guard of some of its choices, then replace that MUX by that choice.

## **Independence and randomness**

- Consider the ancestors of some node.
  - Move backwards in the dependency graph.
  - Also move from "receive"-s to "send"-s.
    - But not towards the future. (use  $\Rightarrow$ )
- If two nodes have non-overlapping sets of ancestors then they are *independent*.
- If at least one of them is random, then they are unequal.
- Typical application:
  - A nonce is generated but never sent out.
  - It is compared with some of the contents of some message received from the network.
  - Then the result must be false.

## **Our dependency graph...**



### NAND

- For certain two boolean nodes we can say that at most of them can be true at any moment.
- This can be propagated downwards:
  - If  $v_1 \overline{\&} v_2$  and  $v_3 = \dots \& v_2 \& \dots$  then  $v_1 \overline{\&} v_3$ .
  - If  $v_2 = w_1 \lor \cdots \lor w_t$  and  $v_1 \overline{\&} w_i$  for all i then  $v_1 \overline{\&} v_2$ .
- Also store coordinate equalities and exceptions to them.
- If we derive  $v \overline{\&} v$  then v is false.

# **Integrity (correspondence) properties**

- Begin- and End-nodes.
  - Have a control dependency and an incoming data edge.
  - Produce no output.
- Non-injective agreement Whenever End(x) is executed, Begin(x) must have been executed as well.
  - ...earlier or at the same time.
  - Use " $\Rightarrow$ " to show it.
- Injective agreement each execution of End(x) has a different execution of Begin(x) not later than it.
  - Often End(x) can happen at most once for each x.
  - Use "NAND" to show it.

## In closing...

- For tracking data dependencies, our representation seems to be ideal.
- Control dependencies are also handled seemingly reasonably.
  - One can consider more or less stringent control flow structures, but the current choice looks like optimal.
- A persistent representation has to be found for data collected for  $\Rightarrow$  and NAND.