

Lecture 12

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Introduction

On the previous lecture we had a look onto interactive proofs, where the system consists of two parts Prover (P) and Verifier (V). Prover is computationally unbounded while Verifier is polynomial-time bounded. Basic scheme of interaction is

1. We provide the system with yes/no question
2. Verifier maps this question to some form Prover will accept and adds randomization
3. Verifier sends challenge to Prover
4. Prover responds with certificate
5. Verifier checks certificate and may proceed or repeat steps 2-5 to be more sure in Prover's capability of finding the answer
6. Verifier gives us yes/no answer

This basic scheme describes complexity class IP (Interactive Proof). For formal definition please refer to the previous lecture's notes. There is slight variation of the IP protocol called Arthur-Merlin (AM) protocol. Arthur plays the Verifier role and Merlin is the omniscient Prover. The only difference is that in AM protocol Prover knows the random coins used by Verifier in step 2. Intuitively it seems that Arthur in an AM-protocol is more constrained than the Verifier in an IP-protocol. Hence the class AM might be smaller than IP.

But we will see that actually these complexity classes are equal.

IP = AM

We will say *Prover* and *Verifier* when talking about IP protocol and *Merlin* and *Arthur* when talking about AM protocol.

Theorem 1 $IP = AM$

Proof

To show that classes are equal we must show both way inclusions.

AM \subseteq IP

We have a problem in AM and we want to simulate it in IP. Each AM-verifier is also an IP-verifier, hence this inclusion is trivial.

IP \subseteq AM

The opposite direction is more complicated. Here we have problem in IP and we want to simulate it in AM. Since Merlin knows all the randomization data he can fool Arthur with less effort than Prover would need to fool Verifier.

Let V be a verifier algorithm and let P be the corresponding prover that makes the verifier accept with maximum possible probability. On the figure below you can see initial protocol in IP. To show that on every step on the simulation we are very close to the original protocol we define time limit T and assume that our protocol runs until limit is reached.




Figure 1: Initial protocol in IP

The sequence of the messages $(x_1, y_1, x_2, y_2, \dots, x_n, y_n)$ we call *transcript*. For each r there is a distinct transcript. Each transcript ends with accept or reject.

Definition 1 *At some point of time τ we will have partial transcript t ; we define $ACC(w, t)$ to be a set of all random bit-strings r which make the transcript start with t and lead to accept.*

Now we can construct AM simulation for the protocol described on Figure 1. The idea is that after each round of the protocol (one x_i, y_i pair) Merlin provides best y_i and wants to convince Arthur that $ACC(w, t_i)$ covers almost all set of outcomes (e.g. almost all outcomes are *accept*).




Figure 2: Protocol in AM

Intuitively this protocol acts in the same way as IP one, but here instead of Verifier picking next x_i randomly, Merlin himself chooses the best x_i . And after protocol is finished the r is the transcript which can act as certificate in original IP protocol.

Why Arthur needs to check $\exists j, k : h_j(x_i) = z_k$ in the end of each round? The reason is that Merlin must convince Arthur that the answer space, where ACC set is defined is big enough. And the way he convinces is by showing that for randomly chosen h_j and z_k Merlin is able to find original in the set of answers.




Figure 3: Merlin should be able to find original of random z_j in S

This whole construction must convince us that after running protocol in AM final transcript r will be suitable transcript for IP. ■

IP = PSPACE

In this section we will show that every problem, which can be solved in IP can be solved in PSPACE and vice versa. As usually, if we want to show equality of the classes we will need to show both way inclusions.

Theorem 2 $IP = PSPACE$

Proof

IP \subseteq PSPACE

Every problem solvable in IP is solvable in PSPACE. As we know from the previous section $IP = AM$, therefore $AM \subseteq PSPACE$ also. Assume we have usual AM protocol:




Figure 4: Abstract AM protocol

For each function

$$f : \{0, 1\}^{l(n)} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$$

we will define

$$\max f = \max\{f(x) : x \in \{0, 1\}^{l(n)}\}$$

$$\text{avg} f = \frac{\sum_{x \in \{0, 1\}^{l(n)}} f(x)}{2^{l(n)}} .$$

At each round of the protocol Arthur randomly chooses x_i and Merlin chooses best y_i , so the probability that Arthur accepts at the end of the protocol can be written as

$$\text{avg}_{x_1} \max_{y_1} \dots \text{avg}_{x_n} \max_{y_n} A(x_1, y_1, \dots, x_n, y_n, w) \quad (1)$$

By definition we know that $A(x_1, y_1, \dots, x_n, y_n, w)$ is computable in polynomial time (otherwise Arthur would not be able to perform final check). This implies that sizes of x_i and y_i are polynomial (otherwise computation of $A(\dots)$ would take more than polynomial time). These two facts together show us that the value (1) is computable in polynomial space.

PSPACE \subseteq IP

Here we must show that every problem solvable in PSPACE is solvable in IP. We will first demonstrate the techniques we're going to use on the problem $\#\text{SAT}_D$ which is both NP-hard and coNP-hard. We will then generalize those techniques to the PSPACE-hard problem TQBF, showing that it belongs to IP.

Arithmetization

We will now deviate from the main direction of the proof and study the idea of arithmetization, since we will use it later.

If we have Boolean formula $\varphi(x_1, \dots, x_n)$ we can transform it into n -variable polynomial as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} P_{x_i} &= x_i \\ P_{\neg\varphi} &= 1 - P_\varphi \\ P_{\varphi_1 \wedge \varphi_2} &= P_{\varphi_1} \cdot P_{\varphi_2} \\ P_{\varphi_1 \vee \varphi_2} &= 1 - (1 - P_{\varphi_1})(1 - P_{\varphi_2}) \end{aligned}$$

For example formula

$$(x_1 \vee x_2) \wedge \neg x_1$$

can be arithmetized as

$$(1 - (1 - x_1)(1 - x_2)) \cdot (1 - x_1)$$

Note that length on the polynomial is linear to length of the Boolean formula: $O(P_\varphi)$ is $O(|\varphi|)$.

$\#\text{SAT}_D \in \text{IP}$

A pair $\langle \varphi, K \rangle$ belongs to the language $\#\text{SAT}_D$ if the formula φ has exactly K satisfying valuations. Number of satisfying valuations can be calculated using

$$\#\varphi = \sum_{b_1 \in \{0,1\}} \dots \sum_{b_n \in \{0,1\}} P_\varphi(b_1, \dots, b_n) .$$

We note that the number of satisfying valuations is at most 2^n . A more general case of such type of verification is to check for any polynomial g whether

$$K = \sum_{b_1 \in \{0,1\}} \dots \sum_{b_m \in \{0,1\}} g(b_1, \dots, b_m) .$$

Sumcheck protocol

For a polynomial $g(x_1, \dots, x_m)$ let $proj_g(x)$ denote the single-variable polynomial

$$proj_{g(x_1, \dots, x_m)}(x) = \sum_{b_2 \in \{0,1\}} \dots \sum_{b_m \in \{0,1\}} g(x, b_2, \dots, b_m) .$$

In the definition of $proj_g$ we implicitly assume that the variables of g are ordered and x is the first variable. Fig. 5 depicts the IP protocol for verifying

$$K = \sum_{b_1 \in \{0,1\}} \dots \sum_{b_m \in \{0,1\}} g(b_1, \dots, b_m)$$

The base case for the Sumcheck protocol is $m = 1$. In this case, Verifier will check only if $g(0) + g(1) = K$.




Figure 5: Sumcheck protocol

TQBF \in IP

The proof works in the same way as for $\#\text{SAT}_D$, but since TQBF includes universal quantifiers the formula will contain products. We will introduce prodcheck protocol, which works in the same way as sumcheck, but polynomials are more complex. Because degree of the polynomials are too large (exponential) Verifier would not be able to work with them, so we must provide the optimization steps to make polynomial degrees low.

Optimizing TQ formula

To make Prodcheck computation more efficient we can bring in new variables, which will allow us to move quantifiers closer to the variables bounded to these quantifiers. For example in the following formula

$$\forall x_2 \forall x_3 (\forall x_1 (x_1 \wedge x_2)) \vee x_3$$

which can be represented as syntax tree, shown in Fig. 6, we can introduce $x'_2 = x_2$ which will allow us to bring $\forall x_2$ closer to variable x_2 :

$$\forall x_2 \forall x_3 \exists x'_2 (x'_2 = x_2 \wedge \forall x_1 (x_1 \wedge x'_2)) \vee x_3$$

The syntax tree for this formula is depicted in Fig. 7.




Figure 6: Syntax tree for $\forall x_2 \forall x_3 (\forall x_1 (x_1 \wedge x_2)) \vee x_3$




Figure 7: Syntax tree for $\forall x_2 \forall x_3 \exists x'_2 (x'_2 = x_2 \wedge \forall x_1 (x_1 \wedge x'_2)) \vee x_3$

Before we move quantifiers closer to the variables we can bring all negations to the front of variables. After that we can arithmetize quantifiers:

$$P_{\exists x \varphi} = \sum_{b \in \{0,1\}} P_{\varphi}(x \leftarrow b)$$

$$P_{\forall x \varphi} = \prod_{b \in \{0,1\}} P_{\varphi}(x \leftarrow b)$$

After these transformation we will get P_{φ} which can be used in the prodcheck protocol to check if P_{φ} has K satisfiable evaluations.

Now the degree of a polynomial P_{φ} is at most $2|\varphi|$.

Prodcheck

As we have mentioned before the scheme of the protocol is the same as for sumcheck protocol. But there are some differences.

- If $\varphi \equiv \varphi_1 \vee \varphi_2$ then Prover sends both values $K_1 = P_{\varphi_1}$ and $K_2 = P_{\varphi_2}$. Verifier checks that $K = K_1 + K_2$ and then runs the protocol for $K_1 \stackrel{?}{=} P_{\varphi_1}$ and $K_2 \stackrel{?}{=} P_{\varphi_2}$
- If $\varphi \equiv \varphi_1 \wedge \varphi_2$ then Prover sends both values $K_1 = P_{\varphi_1}$ and $K_2 = P_{\varphi_2}$. Verifier checks that $K = K_1 \cdot K_2$ and then runs the protocol for $K_1 \stackrel{?}{=} P_{\varphi_1}$ and $K_2 \stackrel{?}{=} P_{\varphi_2}$
- If $\varphi \equiv \exists x \varphi'$ then Prover sends the polynomial $s(x) = P_{\varphi'}(x)$ to Verifier. Verifier checks $s(0) + s(1) \stackrel{?}{=} K$, then picks number $a \in \text{random}$ and run the protocol $P_{\varphi'}(a) \stackrel{?}{=} s(a)$.
- If $\varphi \equiv \forall x \varphi'$ then Prover sends the polynomial $s(x) = P_{\varphi'}(x)$ to Verifier. Verifier checks $s(0) \cdot s(1) \stackrel{?}{=} K$, then picks number $a \in \text{random}$ and run the protocol $P_{\varphi'}(a) \stackrel{?}{=} s(a)$.

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Relationship between PSPACE, P/poly and MA

Theorem 3 *If $PSPACE \subseteq P/poly$ then $PSPACE = MA$*

Proof We use the fact that Merlin can work in PSPACE. $PSPACE \subseteq P/poly$ implies that Merlin can be represented as Boolean circuit of polynomial size, thus Merlin's algorithm can be sent to Arthur. And Arthur can himself run Merlin's algorithm in polynomial time (and polynomial space), thus solving any PSPACE problem in MA. ■